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T HE CONTEMPORARY ENFORCEMENT of international humanitarian law faces a world different from Nuremberg. The World War Two 
Allies, confronted with criminality of staggering proportions, conducted the 
trials of Nazi leaders after Germany's unconditional surrender. Captured Nazi 
archives provided a documentary outline of the Reich's unimaginable plans 
and Allied military occupation of Germany allowed the Nuremberg 
prosecutors direct access to witnesses. 
In prosecuting war crimes in modern civil conflicts, the judicial starting 
point is transformed. The internationalization of war crimes prosecutions is 
seen as a way to restore confidence and allow reconciliation. But prosecutions 
may begin while a conflict is still underway. Achievement of a ceasefire or 
peace agreement does not mean that former belligerents welcome the prospect 
of being held responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law. International peacekeepers can separate opposing forces and protect 
international aid workers, yet are unlikely to have a force structure sufficient to 
protect all potential witnesses against irregulars and hooligans. There is no 
occupation government that displaces the civil administration of the former 
belligerents. While political sentiment may change over time, the wartime 
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political parties are likely to remain influential long after the fighting stops. 
Former belligerents will lack credibility in trying war crimes accusations against 
their own forces and their opponents. International war crimes prosecutors will 
also be hard put to rely on the belligerents for the faithful collection of evidence 
and eyewitness testimony. 
What this means for war crimes prosecutions is brought home in the 
experience of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
The Tribunal was created by the United Nations Security Council in 1993 
under Chapter VII, 1 in the middle of the armed conflict in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. In November 1995, while the Dayton Peace Accord was under 
negotiation, the Tribunal indicted a number of defendants for their roles in 
ethnic cleansing in the Lasva Valley. A prominent defendant was Colonel 
Tihomir Blaskic, who held the position of regional military commander for the 
Croatian Defense Council of Herceg,Bosna, an internationally unrecognized 
Bosnian Croat entity within the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.2 Blaskic 
surrendered to the Tribunal on April 1, 1996, and was permitted to remain 
under house arrest in The Hague. 
The Blaskic Subpoenas 
On January 15, 1997, the Tribunal Prosecutor issued trial subpoenas for the 
production of records from, variously, the Government of Croatia, Croatian 
Defense Minister Gojko Susak, the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and the custodian of records of the central archive of the former Ministry of 
Defense of Herceg,Bosna. These subpoenas have become the center of 
controversy. The practical outcome of the case may define whether an 
international criminal tribunal is able to function effectively as a 
truth,determining forum, for the advantages of impartiality and credibility 
enjoyed by an international tribunal are of little use if such a court cannot 
procure the production of evidence necessary to a fair and accurate 
adjudication. The subpoena dispute tests whether an international court can 
effectively substitute itself for national tribunals in the trial of war crimes, 
genocide, and crimes against humanity. 
The evidence requested in the subpoenas duces tecum addressed to 
the Republic of Croatia and to Bosnia and Herzegovina focuses on 
military operations in Central Bosnia. The requested disclosures were broad, 
and came in the trial process, more than a year after the 
original Blaskic The subpoena to Croatia included requests for 
BlaSkiC's notes and writings sent to the Croatian Ministry of Defense and to the 
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defense authorities of Herceg,Bosna, communications received from those 
quarters, communications between the Croatian Ministry of Defense and other 
officials of Herceg,Bosna, records on Croatia's contribution of weapons, 
supplies, and military units to the Bosnian conflict, and files on investigations 
or prosecutions concerning the 1993 attacks against Muslim civilians in 
Ahmici and other villages in the Lasva Valley. 
The scope of the prosecutor's demand might seem ambitious until one 
recalls that proving grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions requires 
evidence that the Bosnia conflict was "international" in each particular sector 
of the fighting. Otherwise, according to the Tribunal's earlier decisions in the 
Tadic case,3 the charges of grave breach cannot be sustained, since the 
universal jurisdiction of grave breaches only applies in international conflicts. 
In the case of Tihomir Blaskic, an officer of the Croatian Defence Council 
("HVO") of the Croatian Community of Herceg,Bosna, it is Croatia's 
involvement with the HVO and the fighting in central Bosnia that will 
determine the international nature of the conflict for purposes of grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions. 
Many of the subpoenaed records are also central to the proof of command 
responsibility. Command responsibility holds that it is not sufficient to place 
liability on the foot soldier who carries out an illegal action or atrocity. Rather, 
a system of restraint in wartime depends on the role of a commanding officer in 
controlling his troops, and his duty in the chain of command to prevent and 
punish wanton acts. A commanding officer is to be held criminally liable for 
failing to attempt to controL his troops where he knows that widespread atrocities 
are being committed, as well as for ordering troops to take such reprehensible 
action. This is a necessary part of deterrence, and the moral responsibility and 
retribution which criminal law seeks to serve. 
Proof of command responsibility is likely to come from one of two sources-
the testimony of military personnel about the commander's orders and actions 
or the documentary record of a military operation, including copies of written 
orders and communications. Either way, the information must come from 
"official" sources. 
Command responsibility is central in the charges against Blaskic. He may 
not have personally participated in the murders and mayhem committed 
against Muslim civilians in 1993 in the Lasva campaign area. Rather, Blaskic 
will bear criminal responsibility if he ordered or encouraged his troops to 
engage in the atrocities,4 or if he failed to monitor or control their actions, 
allowing the troops to run amok.5 
485 
International Criminal Tribunal 
A more controversial theory of command responsibility might dispense with 
the need for any particularized evidence. Criminal liability could flow, on an 
aggressive theory, from the simple fact of the defendant's position in the chain 
of command and the widespread commission of atrocities by troops under his 
command. But even if this were an attractive theory-and, to be clear, it is not 
provided for by the Tribunal's statute6-the defendant must surely be 
permitted an affirmative defense, to show that he justifiably did not know of 
the misconduct, or made efforts to stop its execution. "Official" sources are 
likely to be important for exculpatory evidence. 
In cases between sovereign States, the fact, finder ordinarily relies upon the 
State parties to produce pertinent evidence. There is no general right of 
"discovery" against the opposing State in an international adjudication, say, 
before the International Court of Justice, although a special master can be 
assigned to investigate and report to the Court and an adverse inference can be 
drawn from a State party's failure to muster proof.7 Each State is required to 
make its case, based on its own records and witnesses, and is free to judge 
whether to disclose sensitive documents to strengthen the case, or to retain the 
advantages of confidentiality. 
Criminal trials are a different matter. They are not State,to,State contests. 
A criminal conviction deprives an individual of his liberty and reputation, and 
involves a rights,based claim to fairness. Criminal proof presumes there will be 
a completeness of investigation and documentation to give meaning to the 
high standard for conviction, whether it is phrased as "proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt" or another test of similar gravity. In a national setting, a 
criminal court has wide latitude to demand the production of evidence from 
third parties and even from official sources. In an international setting, 
individuals do not ordinarily enjoy legal personality, but when placed on trial 
for international criminal responsibility, they must be guaranteed fair process. 
Criminal justice is a newcomer in international fora. The ad hoc tribunals 
created by the Security Council for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are the 
first charged with the international enforcement of the law of war since 
Nuremberg. It is hardly surprising, then, to have difficult problems of first 
impression. The question of how to obtain evidence is a fundamental test, both 
to assure effectiveness in enforcing international humanitarian law, and to 
assure fairness to individual defendants. 
The subpoena duces tecum issued in the BlaSkic case to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was accepted by the Bosnian government, although Bosnia 
indicated that it could not assure the compliance of a nominally subordinate 
official, the custodian of records of the former Defense Ministry of 
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Herceg,Bosna.8 Croatia, however, disputed the authority of the International 
Tribunal to issue a subpoena duces tecum on several grounds: 1) it is improper to 
issue a mandatory order to a sovereign State, especially an order that purports 
to carry a "penalty" for non' compliance, as might be implied by the word 
"subpoena"; 2) no order can be addressed to a particular State official, here, 
Croatian Defense Minister SuSak, and States are entitled to decide how to 
comply with requests for disclosure; and 3) Croatia can withhold information 
affecting national security, a judgment that Croatia reserves to itself. 
Croatia turned over some of the documents requested by the Prosecutor, but 
continued to challenge the authority of the Tribunal to enforce any subpoena 
demand. The Tribunal judge who issued the subpoenas, Judge Gabrielle Kirk 
McDonald of the United States, set down the matter for full briefing and 
hearing before the three judges ofT rial Chamber II, including Judge Elizabeth 
Odio Benito of Costa Rica and Judge Saad Saood Jan of Pakistan. She also 
invited amicus curiae to address four questions: whether a subpoena duces tecum 
can issue to a State, whether it can issue to a high government official of a 
State, whether claims of national security privilege must be accepted, and the 
appropriate remedies in the event of non, compliance. 
The Trial Chamber Decision 
On the first question, in a decision rendered on July 18, 1997,9 the Trial 
Chamber adroitly placed to one side the distracting controversy over 
nomenclature. The term "subpoena" is used in the Court's own rules,10 but the 
Trial Chamber noted that the real dispute was "the International Tribunal's 
authority and power to issue binding compulsory orders, rather than the 
particular nomenclature used for such orders."lt This power could either be 
granted expressly, or could be inherent in the authority of the Tribunal. 
Judge McDonald held that there was such a power. The Tribunal was 
created by the Security Council under Chapter vn authority as a subordinate 
organ,12 yet "must also be possessed of a large degree of independence in order 
to constitute a truly separate institution and in order to be able to fulfil properly 
its judicial mandate, free from political considerations."lJ For a criminal trial 
chamber, it is "imperative" to have "all the relevant evidence before it when 
making its decisions," if only to "guarantee the rights of the accused."14 Croatia 
conceded that the Security Council could have granted the Tribunal the power 
to issue binding orders against States in an authorizing statute-it was a 
delegable power-and simply disputed whether the Council had done S.o.15 An 
absence of express power to issue orders against States in the Statute of the 
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Tribunal would not determine the matter, Judge McDonald found, since the 
Tribunal's granted powers must also be interpreted to make it an effective 
institution. A teleological interpretation of the powers of UN organs was relied 
on by the International Court ofJustice in the Reparations Case, 16 the Effects of 
Awards Case,17 and the Certain Expenses Case. IS 
The Tribunal must have "the inherent power to compel the production of 
documents necessary for a proper execution of its judicial function," Judge 
McDonald concluded.19 Because many of the crimes within the Tribunal's 
compass involve military operations, military records "may constitute vital 
evidence."2o National courts have the power to compel the production of 
evidence from third parties, whether in the criminal justice systems of France, 
Germany, Pakistan, Spain, Scotland, Canada, or the United States.21 The 
European Court ofJustice enjoys the power to compel State parties to produce 
all documents and information "which the court considers desirable," and may 
compel non,party member States and institutions "to supply all information 
which the Court considers necessary for the proceedings."22 Similar power was 
necessary for the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to fairly 
adjudicate war crimes cases. 
The decision did not rest on teleology alone. The Tribunal's Statute 
sustained the power to gather evidence by compulsory orders, Judge McDonald 
found. Article 19 of the Statute, approved by the Security Council, entitles a 
judge to issue "any ... orders as may be required for the conduct of the trial," 
and Article 29 requires that States comply with any orders issued by a trial 
chamber of the T ribunalY The mandatory nature of these measures is hardly 
surprising in a Tribunal created under Chapter VII authority. The power of the 
Tribunal to bind States is shown, for example, in the Tribunal's right to require 
States to defer a national prosecution in favor of the international case. The 
Report of the Secretary,General on the establishment of the Tribunal similarly 
notes that orders for the surrender or transfer of defendants "shall be 
considered to be the application of an enforcement measure under Chapter VII 
of the Charter of the United Nations."24 
On the issue of possible penalties for non, compliance, the Trial Chamber 
was more reticent, finding the question not necessary for decision. The term 
"subpoena" is not meant to be a root,and,branch transplant from common law 
systems, Judge McDonald found; the alternative term "assignation" is used in 
the authentic French text. There is, therefore, no necessary connotation of 
penalty or coercive action.2S It remains an open question what penalty, if any, 
may attend a State failure to comply with an order of production, Judge 
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McDonald said. And a "penalty" could amount to no more than a "note of 
non-compliance and reference of the matter to the Security Council."z6 
Addressing subpoenas to named government officials was also approved by 
the Trial Chamber. The Tribunal has the power to direct binding orders to 
States and to private individuals; hence, it broke no barrier to permit their 
direction to named officials of the government. Although a State may 
designate a liaison to assist in the production of evidence, it cannot shield 
particular government officials from the duty of production. "The 
International Tribunal must have powers that are both practical and effective," 
Judge McDonald noted, "and, as a criminal institution, this dictates that it seek 
the most direct route to any evidence which may have a bearing on the finding 
of guilt or innocence of the accused."z7 
However, the Trial Chamber made a considerable concession to the 
conflicting obligations that may constrain a State official. States and 
individuals have a duty of compliance with the binding orders of the Tribunal. 
But a resistant State may interfere with an official's attempt to comply, and 
forbid him to tum over desired documents. It could be unfair to place an 
individual in such a difficult position of conflict, Judge McDonald concluded. 
On the principle of ultra posse nemo tenetur-that an impossible act cannot be 
required-and because the Tribunal lacks police power to protect individuals 
against State retaliation, such an official is permitted to explain why 
compliance is not within his individual choice.28 Of course, other witnesses 
may face local retaliation for compliance with orders to testify, but the Tribunal 
did not say what would happen if an ordinary witness made the same plea. 
Judge McDonald also made clear that overbreadth or lack of specificity of a 
subpoena remains a potentially valid ground for challenge. Looking to national 
practice, the Tribunal noted that trial subpoenas could not be used for "fishing 
expeditions," but had to look toward the production of admissible or potentially 
admissible evidence. Croatia's objections on grounds of overbreadth were 
referred to the separate Trial Chamber conducting the Blaski6 trial.Z9 
Finally, the Trial Chamber ruled that national security claims deserved 
careful consideration but not automatic deference.3o The need for pertinent 
evidence at trial had to be weighed alongside the valid interest that States may 
have in the protection of sensitive information. Any blanket exemption would 
cripple the doctrine of command responsibility, since the records of military 
operations lie at the center of proof of a commander's conduct. National 
security claims have to be made with specificity, and evaluated by the Tribunal 
in light of the procedures available to minimize the prejudice of disclosure, such 
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as redaction of documents and closed proceedings. In the last analysis, the 
responsibility for weighing the concerns belongs to the Tribunal itself.3! 
The Appeals Chamber Decision 
After the decision of Trial Chamber IT in July 1997, Croatia immediately took 
an appeal. Although the BlaSkic trial had already begun on June 24, 1997, the 
Appeals Chamber stayed enforcement of the trial subpoenas.32 The appeal 
attracted amicus curiae briefs from several governments.33 The decision was 
delivered several months later, on October 29, 1997, with an opinion by President 
of the Tribunal Antonio Cassese,34 dramatically headlined by the Tribunal's press 
office as "unanimously quash[ing]" the subpoenas issued to Croatia and Defense 
Minister SuSak,35 but importanciy holding that "binding Qrders" could be issued to 
Croatia,36 and that there was no absolute national security privilege. 
The overall judgment was in fact complicated, but two architectural 
features are clear. Each calls into some question the future competence of the 
International Tribunal as a judicial body. First, the Appeals 
Chamber went out of its way to hold that the Tribunal lacks any direct 
enforcement powers against States to obtain the production of evidence. If a 
State declines to produce evidence pursuant to a binding order, the Tribunal's 
only recourse is to report the matter to the Security Council.37 The Tribunal, in 
the Appeals Chamber's view, cannot even recommend a course of action to the 
Council.38 There is little explanation of this result, especially against a 
background in which the European Court of Justice is now permitted to 
sanction States in civil cases.39 Judge Cassese notes, simply, that "[h]ad the 
drafters of the [Tribunal's] Statute intended to vest the International Tribunal 
with such a power they would have expressly provided for it. In the case of an 
international judicial body, this is not a power that can be regarded as inherent 
in its functions.,,40 The time pressure on the Security Council in creating the 
Tribunal in 1993 may not warrant such a spare account of the drafters' 
intention. One can instead take the result as the Appeals Chamber's estimate 
of what structure will or will not disturb some member countries.41 The danger, 
of course, is that this dependency of the Tribunal potentially involves the 
Security Council in the intimate decisions of the conduct of a trial. Although 
the failure of a requested country to surrender or arrest an indicted defendant 
is, under the Court's rules,42 also reported to the Security Council, 
the entry of politics into enforcement is perhaps less troubling at the pretrial 
stage than to have politics shape the availability of inculpatory and exculpatory 
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evidence in an ongoing case. The limits of the autonomy of the Tribunal as an 
independent judicial institution are sharply drawn by this outcome.43 
One may also wonder why the Appeals Chamber chose to address penalties 
at this stage of the proceeding, before it is known whether Croatia would 
comply with the Tribunal's orders of production. Judge McDonald held that it 
was premature to decide possible penalties for non, compliance. Judge Cassese 
supposed that this depended on an idea of "ripeness" peculiar only to American 
, jurisprudence, though judicial prudence is surely not so culturally specific. 
Under a "tariff' theory of jurisprudence, a disobedient may wish to know 
the "cost" of his defiance in advance, but a Court wishing to establish its 
authority does not owe a duty to the recalcitrant to announce in advance the 
costs and benefits of resistance. 
The Appeals Chamber's second restriction was to allow States to decide who 
can testify as a document custodian.44 A named official cannot be: called to 
appear in court, the appellate judges held, because States traditionally have had 
the right under customary international law to decide how they will go about 
fulfilling their international obligations, and individual officials are insulated 
from liability for acts undertaken on behalf of the State. But, as the Appeals 
Chamber remarks without stopping, the major exception to this immunizing rule 
of "acts of State" has been the law of war crimes and international humanitarian 
law.45 It is a fundamental tenet of the modem law of war that State officials 
cannot take refuge from individual responsibility for illegal acts by invoking a 
claim of superior orders or State authority. It is surprising then, indeed, that the 
appeals judges should resurrect a doctrine of "acts of State" when it weakens the 
very procedures seeking to give teeth to the law of war. 
The Court's misstep may be a result of not comprehending the full function 
of a custodian of documents as an evidentiary witness at trial. Documents 
cannot be assumed to be authentic, accurate, or complete. A custodian of 
documents is needed to authenticate the documents as genuine, to describe 
the routine by which they were kept, to describe how they were searched for 
and retrieved, and to say whether the run of documents is known to be 
complete. Even in ordinary conditions of peacetime, all custodians are not 
created equal-the evidentiary weight of the documents may depend on the 
persuasiveness of the testimony of the custodian. In the fog of war, with fluid 
conditions on a military front, the testimony of a custodian of documents is 
even more critical-to establish, for instance, whether a set of incoming 
reports from a field commander is preserved in whole or only in part. 
Commissioning the former belligerent States in the Yugoslav conflict to pick 
and choose which officials will be available to testify can undercut the strength 
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of the prosecution's evidence, and imperil a defendant's search for exculpatory 
evidence. 
Equally troublesome is the Appeals Chamber's intimation that the Tribunal 
may not call factual eyewitnesses who happen to be government officials. 
Although Croatia's challenge concerns document subpoenas, with no issue or 
decision in the Trial Chamber concerning subpoenas ad testificandum, the 
Appeals Chamber went out of its way to address what eyewitnesses can be 
subjected to a subpoena or binding order to testify. An individual acting in a 
private capacity could be subpoenaed before the Tribunal, the Appeals 
Chamber said.46 But a State official could not be summoned, either by 
subpoena or binding order.47 And on the crucial question of when a witness has 
acted in an official capacity, the Appeals Chamber gave the following 
enigmatic explanation: 
It should be noted that the class of "individuals acting in their private capacity" 
also includes State agents who, for instance, witnessed a crime before they took 
offlce, or found or were given evidentiary material of relevance for the 
prosecution or the defence prior to the initiation of their official duties. In this 
case, the individuals can legitimately be the addressees of a subpoena. Their role 
in the prosecutorial or judicial proceedings before the International Tribunal is 
unrelated to their current functions as State offlcials.4S 
But if the official witnessed an atrocity at first hand while serving in office, the 
result is more equivocal. The Appeals Chamber posed 
the example of a colonel who, in the course of a routine transfer to another 
combat zone, overhears a general issuing orders aimed at the shelling of civilians 
or civilian objects, In this case the individual must be deemed to have acted in a 
private capacity and may therefore be compelled by the International Tribunal 
to testify as to the events witnessed. By contrast, if the State official, when he 
witnessed the crime, was actually exercising his functions, i.e., the monitoring of 
the events was part of his offlcial functions, then he was acting as a State organ 
and cannot be subpoenaed, as is illustrated by the case where the imaginary 
colonel overheard the order while on an offlcial inspection mission concerning 
the behaviour of the belligerents on the battlefield.49 
It is not entirely clear, from this loosely drafted hypothetical, whether the 
Appeals Chamber is resting on a distinction between "subpoenas" and "binding 
orders," but it might appear from the heading of the section-"Whether the 
International Tribunal May Issue Binding Orders to Individuals Acting in 
Their Private Capacity"-that the colonel tasked to monitor battlefield 
492 
Ruth Wedgwood 
operations is to be insulated from any form of compulsory process. This is an 
extraordinary bouleversement, potentially depriving the Tribunal of a critical 
source of testimony. A charitable reading of the opinion is to dismiss this as 
unnecessary dicta and superfluous illustration. 
One may also speculate that perhaps the Appeals Chamber was primarily 
concerned with the initial addressee of an order to testify-that a binding order 
still could be directed to the State in question, requiring the eyewitness 
testimony of the particular named official. After all, the vital nature of official 
eyewitness testimony is self,evident. This reading of}udge Cassese's opinion is 
warranted by his ultimate conclusion that no grave harm should be done to the 
efficacy of proof. "[I] n the case of State officials there is no compelling reason 
warranting a departure from general rules [ofinternationallaw]. To make use 
of the powers flowing from Article 29 of the Statute, it is sufficient for the 
International Tribunal to direct its orders and requests to States .... " By 
contrast, Judge Cassese observes, Croatia's claim of an unbounded national 
security privilege would shield "documents that might prove of decisive 
importance to the conduct of trials" and would "be tantamount to 
undermining the very essence of the International Tribunal's functions."so 
Nonetheless, the impracticality of the Tribunal's etiquette of address 
remains. The Appeals Chamber notes later that, at least in contacting private 
individuals, it "might jeopardise investigations" to go through the governments 
of former belligerent States or entities, "some authorities of which might be 
implicated in the commission of these crimes."S1 This would seem equally true 
in the case of official eyewitnesses who formerly served as officials or employees 
of the belligerent governments. 
Despite the general immunity of international organizations from 
judicial process, the Tribunal does not extend the umbrella of "public 
capacity" to members of international peacekeeping forces. If a member of 
UNPROFOR, IFOR, or SFOR "witnesses the commission or the planning of a 
crime in a monitoring capacity, while performing his official functions, he 
should be treated by the International Tribunal qua an individual. Such an 
officer is present in the former Yugoslavia as a member of an international 
armed force responsible for maintaining or enforcing peace and not qua a 
member of the military structure of his own country."S2 It is less than clear 
why the national versus international structure of a military organization 
should change the availability of an individual eyewitness at trial, unless the 
Appeals Chamber believes that members of a troop' contributing country 
have a greater duty of obedience to Security Council decisions than do the 
soldiers of belligerents. 
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One promising caveat noted by the Appeals Chamber is that where a State 
has been required to produce documents for trial and the pertinent State 
official resists doing so, if the State is unable to coerce his compliance, then "it 
is sound practice to 'downgrade', as it were, the State official to the rank of an 
individual acting in a private capacity," and subject him to a subpoena and 
proceedings for contempt.S3 
But the Appeals Chamber also limits the scope of subpoena power in a 
fashion that could make prosecutions more difficult. Citing Croatia's stylized 
complaint against "highly controversial discovery process," the 
Appeals Chamber strictured that any requests must identify "specific 
documents," rather than "broad categories," must not be "unduly onerous" or 
"overly taxing" and certainly could not number in the "hundreds of 
documents."s4 In trying to reconstruct battlefield supervision, these may not be 
realistic limits. 
Still, in important steps forward, the Appeals Chamber sustains the holding 
that States are subject to binding orders of the Tribunal for the production of 
documentary evidence, and dismisses Croatia's contention that an absolute 
national security privilege should be recognized. Claims that the disclosure of 
military documents will prejudice national security must be substantiated by 
submitting the documents to the scrutiny of a Judge of the Trial Chamber forin 
camera review, to decide whether they are relevant to the proceeding and 
whether their relevance is "outweighed, in the appraisal of the Judge, by the 
need to safeguard legitimate national security concerns."S5 Redaction of parts 
of a document may be permitted before their use at trial. In the "exceptional 
case" of "one or two particular documents" of great "delica[cy] from the 
national security point of view," a State may be excused from submitting the 
documents to the Judge based on generic representations of the reasons for 
this. In a world in which it is dangerous to compromise human intelligence 
sources and the capability of national technical means, this is a wise exception. 
The Tribunal faces a considerable dilemma. On the one hand, the proof of 
command responsibility for atrocities in wartime may often crucially depend on 
evidentiary use of the belligerents' military records. On the other hand, even 
former belligerents, and certainly "third party" countries, may have a legitimate 
concern about national security. The ethical standards attending international 
judicial office and the procedural precautions described in the Appeals 
Chamber's opinion may not persuade national governments that they can 
afford the risks of complete disclosure in the most serious cases. Thus, allowing 
some practical elbow room in the opinion was the wisest course. 
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Interestingly, here the Appeals Chamber humors a distinction among State 
actors. Unlike its earlier insistence that no distinction should be recognized 
among the sources of obligation to the Tribunal, even for former belligerent 
States bound by the Dayton Accord,s6 the Appeals Chamber is willing to credit 
a particular State's track record of cooperation with the Tribunal in assessing a 
national security claim.s7 
As a matter of interpretive method, one may question the acrobatics of the 
"clear statement" rule-why the Appeals Chamber is willing to assume that 
the drafters of the Tribunal's statute intended to preserve the procedural 
immunity of State officials from subpoena, while newly compelling the 
disclosure of national security documents. The Appeals Chamber heralds the 
"innovative and sweeping obligation laid down in Article 29" with "its 
undeniable effects on State sovereignty and national security."SB "Whenever 
the Statute intends to place a limitation on the International Tribunal's 
powers, it does so explicitly," the Appeals Chamber offers, adding that "it 
would be unwarranted to read into Article 29 limitations or restrictions on the 
powers of the International Tribunal not expressly envisaged either in Article 
29 or in other provisions of the Statute."S9 One wonders why this interpretive 
principle applies to the national security exception, but not to the subpoena of 
State officials or the imposition of coercive measures on former belligerents 
that decline to produce necessary documents. 
One of the difficulties of the method of the BlaSkic appeals opinion, in the 
long run, is what it means for the permanent International Criminal Court. 
The ambivalence toward a tribunal's inherent powers in crafting a workable 
procedure for investigations and trial places a heavy burden on the prospective 
State parties of a permanent court, to assure that the new treaty provides for 
most serious contingencies that a court will face. Unlike a domestic judiciary, 
where structure and procedure can be crafted by the courts over time in a 
dialogue with the legislative branch, creational acts in the international system 
are far more occasional, and treaty amendment will be a slow and cumbersome 
process. Thus the statute for a permanent court addressed by the Rome 
diplomatic conference in 1998 must be measured against the strict standard of 
whether its text yields a workable institution or a stillborn structure. In light of 
BlaSkic, one cannot count upon the creative powers of judges to fill out an 
incomplete sketch. 
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